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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy Judge Eugene Wedoff and Creighton Law School professors
Marianne Culhane and Michaela White engage in a spirited debate over a
series of law review articles about the proper scope of motions to dismiss a
debtor's petition under section 707(b) of the freshly revised Bankruptcy
Code.1 It is an interesting and provocative dialogue, with both sides advanc-
ing their respective positions persuasively. As a result, I find myself in the
unfortunate position of wanting to agree with both. Since that is impossible,
however, this brief article is my attempt to find a middle ground between
their two positions. It does so in five parts: Part II explains the debate; Part III
takes issue with Judge Wedoff; Part IV takes issue with professors Culhane
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to
Rita Abro for research assistance and to all participants, especially Mechele
Dickerson, at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law "Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on Bankruptcy Reform" Conference.
1. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is
the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 665 (2005); Eugene
Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(B), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 234 (2005)
[hereinafter Wedoff, Means Testing]; Eugene R. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion to Find
Abuse Under Section 707(b)(3), 71 Mo. L. REv. 1035 (2006) [hereinafter Wedoff,
Judicial Discretion].
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and White; Part V offers an attempt to strike a middle ground; and Part VI
concludes.
II. THE DEBATE
This analysis will not repeat the complete timeline of the section 707(b)
amendments, nor will it try to parse their legislative history. Instead, it will
look at section 707(b) as it formerly was and as it now is under the recently
enacted Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA").'
The former section 707(b) was itself an amendment to the overhauled
Bankruptcy Code of 1978.3 When Congress passed the then-new Code in
1978, it allowed consumer debtors, not without some dissent,4 to choose be-
tween Chapter 7 liquidation plans and Chapter 13 wage-earner plans.5 Per-
haps unhappy with the early workings of this new Code, or perhaps captured
by a credit lobby that preferred Chapter 13, Congress was persuaded in 1984
to chip away at this debtor choice by adding section 707(b). While some ad-
vocated amending the Code to force certain debtors to file under Chapter 13,
Congress took the time-honored approach of the compromise with the
amendment. It declined requiring debtors to file Chapter 13 but allowed
bankruptcy judges the discretion to make them do so.6 It accomplished this
procedurally by endowing judges with the power to dismiss a debtor's Chap-
ter 7 petition - which would require the debtor to refile under Chapter 13 to
seek bankruptcy protection - if the judge felt that the debtor's relief through
Chapter 7 constituted "a substantial abuse.' 7
2. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.) [hereinafter BAPCPA].
3. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 added
section 707(b) to the Bankruptcy Code, which allowed bankruptcy courts to dismiss a
debtor's Chapter 7 petition for relief if it found that granting the relief would be a
"substantial abuse" of Chapter 7. See Vandiver, infra note 4, at 550.
4. See Robert B. Vandiver, Jr., Bankruptcy - A Review of Recent Court Deci-
sions Applying Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to Chapter 7 Proceedings, 22
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 549, 549-50 (1992) (discussing Congress's decision to allow
debtors to choose between filing for bankruptcy protection under either Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13 of the Code when it enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978 even
though the consumer credit industry complained that too many individuals who could
afford to repay their consumer debts would choose to discharge all their debts under
Chapter 7).
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
6. See Vandiver, supra note 4, at 549-50; see also 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1984)
(current version at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005)).
7. Prior to the 2005 amendments, section 707(b) read:
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Congress left the amorphous standard of "substantial abuse" undefined,
and so it was the courts who were given the task of filling it out. They did so
by propounding an array of judicial tests, each with seemingly more prongs
than the last.8 An important difference among these judicial tests interpreting
section 707(b) was the treatment of debtor income, or more precisely, the
treatment of debtor net income after the deduction of court-approved ex-
penses. Some courts (the "ability to pay" group) held that if the debtor had
surplus net income after deducting his reasonable and necessary living ex-
penses, and hence could pay some money into a wage-earner Chapter 13 plan,
it was dispositively "substantial abuse" to liquidate under Chapter 7 instead
of filing under 13. 9 Others held that the debtor's choice to pick liquidation
over a wage-earner plan, even in the face of surplus disposable income, could
not be undone without amending the Code. They reserved section 707(b)
dismissal for instances of bad faith or misconduct (the "misconduct" group),
and held that ability to pay alone could not justify dismissal. 10 A third camp
came out in the middle, saying that the debtor's ability to pay his debts,
measured by the presence of surplus disposable income after deducting rea-
sonable and necessary living expenses, was one of the many factors that
could be considered, but would not be dispositive when gauging "substantial
abuse" under section 707(b) (the "totality of the circumstances" group).
1'
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by
the United States trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party
in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this
chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the grant-
ing of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005).
8. See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 493 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988) (leading
case setting out the ability to pay test and establishing per se rule that the debtor's
ability to pay debts under a hypothetical Chapter 13 repayment plan, standing alone,
warrants dismissal under section 707(b)); In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 239 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1998) ("If a debtor can meet debts without difficulty as the debts come due,
then use of Chapter 7 represents a substantial abuse .... If, on the other hand, a
debtor cannot meet debts as the debts become due ... dismissal of the case pursuant
to 707(b) is unwarranted.").
10. See, e.g., Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991)
("[T]he real concern behind Section 707(b) [is] abuse of the bankruptcy process by a
debtor seeking to take unfair advantage of his creditors.... [S]olvency alone is not a
sufficient basis for a finding that the debtor has in fact substantially abused the provi-
sions of Chapter 7.").
11. See, e.g., In re White, 49 B.R. 869, 873 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (holding
that to determine whether substantial abuse exists, a court must look at "the totality of
the circumstances presented, including the effects upon the petitioner and his credi-
tors should relief under Chapter 7 be granted, or alternatively, denied"); see also In re
May, 261 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that "having income in
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In enacting the BAPCPA last year, Congress apparently decided that the
"substantial abuse" test was not working.' 2 Perhaps it was dissatisfied with
how that judicially administered test had been teased out in the courts, or
perhaps it ignored the recommendations of a bipartisan commission and fa-
vored a bill drafted by credit industry lobbyists. That is a discussion for an-
other day. Whatever its motivations, Congress replaced the judicially admin-
istered "substantial abuse" test with a painstakingly detailed statutory "means
test," ballooning section 707(b) into five single-spaced pages of Code. 13 In so
doing, it seemed to align with the "ability to pay" case line under former sec-
tion 707(b) or, more accurately, seemed to reject the "misconduct" case line
that required some form of wrongdoing for dismissal.
The revised section 707(b)(2)(A) contains this means test. It establishes
a regimented list of includable sources of income and deductible expenses
that must be used to calculate a debtor's surplus monthly income. 14 If that
surplus is greater than a statutory amount (generally $166), the debtor flunks
the means test and is dismissed from Chapter 7: Congress says he is an abuser
as a matter of law. 15 If the debtor's surplus income is less than the threshold,
he remains otherwise eligible for Chapter 7.16
So what is the debate between Judge Wedoff and Professors Culhane
and White? It comes from Congress's statutory caveat that the means test -
formally, the "presumption of abuse" that is generated by flunking the surplus
income test under section 707(b)(2)(A) - is not the exclusive ground for
dismissing a debtor from Chapter 7.17 Consider in this regard the ordering of
the subsections of new section 707(b).
Section 707(b)(1) provides that "the court. .. may dismiss a case ... if
it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this
chapter."'
18
excess of necessary expenses is not, by itself, sufficient to support a finding of sub-
stantial abuse of Chapter 7, and the bankruptcy court should engage in a 'totality of
the circumstances' analysis in determining whether a discharge would be a substantial
abuse of Chapter 7"). Note that Judge Wedoff, with more detailed analysis, accurately
breaks the cases out into four groups. Wedoff, Means Testing, supra note 1, at 235. I
am simplifying the taxonomy for convenience.
12. This decision took the better part of eight years. See Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005); see also Culhane & White, supra
note 1, at 668.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A). "Current Monthly Income" is defined in 11
U.S.C. § 101(10A).
15. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A).
16. Note that most debtors, specifically those with below-median income, bypass
the means test, "passing" as a matter of law. Id. § 707(b)(7).
17. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A).
18. Id. § 707(b)(1).
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Section 707(b)(2) in turn instructs that "[i]n considering under para-
graph (1) whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions
of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse exists if [the means test is
failed]."' 9
Section 707(b)(3) then eliminates doubt regarding the means test's non-
exclusivity as grounds for dismissing debtors from Chapter 7. It endows the
judge with the additional discretion to dismiss a case under Section 707(b)(1)
"in which the presumption [of abuse] in []paragraph [(2)](A)(i) ... does not
arise or is rebutted., 20 To do so, the judge must consider:
(A) whether the debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or
(B) the totality of the circumstances (including whether the debtor
seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need
for such rejection as sought by the debtor) of the debtor's financial
situation demonstrates abuse.
2'
Clause (A) of (b)(3) doesn't cause much fuss. Who denies the judge of
an equitable proceeding the power to dismiss a petitioner who comes in bad
faith? Clause (B), however, does. Judge Wedoff reads "'the totality of the
circumstances ... of the debtor's financial situation' as conferring authority
on bankruptcy judges to boot debtors out of Chapter 7 who pass the means
test if those debtors nonetheless have, in those judges' second-look views, an
"ability to pay" their debts.22 Professors Culhane and White disagree and
think that this exception narrowly applies only to serious forms of misconduct
that are "manifestly unreasonable," such as, for example, "cheating" on the
means test by manipulating a revenue stream.2 3 Absent wrongdoing, the pro-
fessors contend, dismissal under section 707(b)(3)(B) would be improper.
Note how both find cognates in the pre-BAPCPA case law: the "ability to
pay" group and the "misconduct" group of cases. Both of these positions, at
least as just characterized, have merit but are not without difficulty.
IIH. PROBLEMS WITH JUDGE WEDOFF' S PosIrION
A. The Means Test, Despite Its Label, Is Not A Presumption
Judge Wedoff s position suffers from two impediments, one operational
and the other theoretical. The operational problem is that he mistakenly inter-
19. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
20. Id. § 707(b)(3).
21. Id. § 707(b)(3)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
22. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion, supra note 1, at 1040 (omission in original).
23. Culhane & White, supra note 1, at 666, 668, 687-88.
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prets the means test of section 707(b)(2)(A) as an evidentiary presumption.
2 4
This is not surprising, as Congress has explicitly called it that ("[T]he court
shall presume abuse exists."). 25 It similarly styles section 707(b)(2)(B) as the
means of rebutting that "presumption" ("[T]he presumption of abuse may
only be rebutted by").26 Following this linguistic miscue of Congress, Wedoff
reasons that if the means test is merely a presumption, and that presumption
can be rebutted, then it must serve as "merely one" of several possible routes
27to show income-related abuse of Chapter 7. He likens the means test to the
paternity presumption that arises with regard to the husband of an infant's
mother.28 The gentleman is presumed to be the baby's father, but genetic or
other evidence can also show his paternity directly if he is unmarried to the
mother and hence the presumption does not apply.29
The means test is not, however, an evidentiary presumption in the sense
of a foundational fact (marriage) that assists in proving a presumed fact (pa-
ternity). While unquestionably styled as a "presumption," the means test is
more accurately viewed as a jurisdiction-stripping statute. Leaving aside the
difference between a fact (paternity) and a legal determination (abuse of
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code), the function of the means test is to re-
quire dismissal, and hence forbid jurisdiction, for Chapter 7 debtors whose
monthly surplus income is greater than $166. This reading of the means test
as a jurisdiction-stripper rather than an evidentiary presumption is enforced
by the fact that Section 707(b)(2)(B) is the exclusive method by which the
debtor can "rebut" the so-called presumption. 30 Contrary to what one would
expect from a real evidentiary presumption, section 707(b)(2)(B) only allows
a debtor to challenge the method by which the court has calculated the sur-
plus income under section 707(b)(2)(A). She may not, as Judge Wedoff him-
self concedes, introduce evidence that notwithstanding her surplus monthly
24. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion, supra note 1, at 1037 ("The key to understand-
ing the proper role of the means test in Chapter 7 is to recognize that it is simply a
mechanism for generating a presumption; it does not result in any final determina-
tion.").
25. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2005) (emphasis added).
26. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B).
27. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion, supra note 1, at 1040 ("The function of the
means test as a presumption has one final critical feature. A presumption is merely
one method of establishing a fact. Where a presumption does not arise, a party may
prove the necessary fact directly, using the same kind of evidence that could be used
to rebut the presumption.").
28. Id. at 5 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(b) (2005) (providing for rebuttal of
the marital paternity presumption by clear and convincing evidence)).
29. Just as, presumably, a husband seeking to disclaim paternity could rebut the
presumption through DNA or other evidence.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. V 2005) ("In any proceeding brought
under this subsection, the presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by demonstrat-
ing special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to
active duty in the Armed Forces .... ").
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income of $167, she is not abusing the provisions of Chapter 7.31 As such, the
means test is not a rebuttable evidentiary presumption in the traditional sense.
It is an irrebuttable jurisdictional rule that permits exception only for miscal-
culation.
Let us examine with more scrutiny the only permissible way the debtor
may "rebut" the means test "presumption" regarding his surplus monthly
income. Section 707(b)(2)(B) provides that "the presumption of abuse may
only be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious
medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces, to the
extent such special circumstances justify additional expenses or adjustments
of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative."32 On
the income side, a reservist whose $167 surplus income was unfairly high
under the means test's trailing six-month formula could seek an adjustment to
his calculation by showing that his substantial overtime pay will evaporate as
he gets called up for active service next month. Similarly, on the expense
side, a disease sufferer could show that his recurrent illness, presently in re-
mission, requires him to build up a reserve account to deal with future onsets
such that an additional "sickness reserve" expense (which is not allowed un-
der the means test) is necessary. But there would be no room to "rebut" the
"presumption" of abuse by a debtor with surplus income of $167, who, for
example, wants to submit evidence that he has worked hard, had his debts
incurred in good faith, and would only be able to pay a 1% dividend to credi-
tors if subjected to a five-year wage-earner plan: in short, that it would be a
waste of time for such a debtor to file in Chapter 13. He is abusive as a matter
of law and is barred from Chapter 7. There is not jurisdiction, however sensi-
ble it might be, to let such a debtor in.
This operation of the means test enables debtors to challenge the metric,
but not the merits, of their surplus income. Professors at law schools, such as
my own, that strip faculty of jurisdiction to change grades after submission to
the registrar but provide for an exception for mistabulated grades should find
this framework familiar. 33 It is a bright-line rule. To say that it creates a "re-
buttable presumption" that the submitted grade is the final grade when the
only way of rebutting the presumption is to show that the grade was added up
incorrectly is doublespeak of the highest order. It is not a presumption, let
31. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion, supra note 1, at 1047 ("Disposable income of
more than $166.66 per month... is always an abuse requiring denial of Chapter 7
relief."). Wedoff summarizes that a debtor seeking Chapter 7 relief may "rebut the
means test's calculation of disposable income in an amount above the abuse thresh-
old; [but § 707(b)(2)(B)] does not allow any argument that the threshold itself is too
low." Id. at 1046-47.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
33. The rationale behind this rule is a commendable anti-whining principle.
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alone a rebuttable one, that submitted grades are final. It is a rule that submit-
ted grades are final, absent calculation error. There is no appeal.34
B. Congress Legislated "Should Pay, " Not "Can Pay"
The parts of Judge Wedoff' s analysis that go astray cannot all be blamed
on Congress's poor diction. Another problem arises from the more theoretical
conflation of the means-test-calculated surplus income with the concept of the
"ability to pay" that finds its roots in Chapter 13.35 This is again not the fault
of Wedoff; Culhane and White also use the label "can pays" to describe those
who flunk the means test. 36 This is another unfortunate word choice, because
a more accurate label would have been "should pays."
Consider, by way of contrast (and contrasts are important in statutory in-
terpretation),37 Chapter 13, in which a debtor deducts his "reasonable and
necessary expenses" in arriving at what Chapter 13 explicitly calls his "dis-
posable income.,, 38 BAPCPA modifies this rule for certain above-median
income debtors, but the old law still holds for the vast majority of Chapter 13
filers. 39 If the debtor only deducts his reasonable and necessary living ex-
penses, that which remains is all that he "can" pay to his creditors (assuming
we want the debtor to continue living). By contrast, under the Chapter 7
means test, the debtor deducts a particularized list of allowed expenses; the
term "disposable income," familiar from Chapter 13's text, is assiduously
avoided by Congress in Section 707. Some of these allowed expenses are
34. I am led to believe (seulement par les autres) that many states adopt similar
"presumptions" regarding radar-recorded evidence of motorists' speed; they permit
"rebuttal" only by showing mechanical default. My colleague, Professor James J.
White, may have further insight from experience.
35. See, e.g., Wedoff, Judicial Discretion, supra note 1, at 1040 ("Given that the
means test is directed at measuring debt-paying ability as a presumption, this direction
confirms that where the presumption does not arise, the debtor's actual debt-paying
ability must be assessed in ruling on a motion under § 707(b)(1).").
36. Culhane & White, supra note 1, at 700 n.1 ("We use 'can-pay' to describe
debtors who fail the means test, and 'can't-pay' for those who pass it.").
37. See, e.g., Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S.
152 (1912) (holding that when different language is used in different parts of a statute,
it is presumed that the language is used with a different intent).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2005) ("If the trustee .. . objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless.., the plan
provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the
applicable commitment period .. .will be applied to make payments to unsecured
creditors under the plan.") (emphasis added); id. § 1325(b)(2) ("[T]he term 'dispos-
able income' means current monthly income received by the debtor. . . less amounts
reasonably necessary to be expended.").




fixed by IRS schedules for food, housing, and such. Others are limited by
what the debtor actually spends. 41 Thus we cannot envision surplus income
calculated under the means test as what the debtor can pay. Rather, we must
say it is what Congress, as a policy determination, has decided that the debtor
should pay (whether under his current circumstances he can afford to or
42not). Any doubt about the difference between what a debtor can and should
pay under Section 707(b) should be removed by Section 707(b)(2)(D) in
which Congress expressly exempts certain disabled veterans from the juris-
dictional bar of the means test.43 We are unable to pretend these vets can't
pay; a simple calculation of surplus income over $166 would refute that con-
tention. Instead we must say that Congress made a normative, value-laden
judgment that although other similarly situated debtors should pay, these vet-
erans, perhaps as thanks for their service, should not (and do not) have to pay.
Such is Congress's prerogative.
The confusion of Chapter 13's can-pay test with Chapter 7's should-pay
test leads Wedoff to conclude that the means test's routinized calculations are
simply a rough and ready proxy for the more particularized, case-specific
investigation of "can-pay" that occurs under Chapter 13. 44 This in turn ex-
plains Wedoff's reading of Section 707(b)(3). If the means test, with its al-
lowed living expenses, is simply a rough first cut at finding debtors who can
pay, a judge or U.S. Trustee can use Section 707(b)(3) to do the individual,
case-specific follow-up analysis of the debtor's actual reasonable and neces-
sary expenses that is traditionally performed under Chapter 13. If the judge
conducting this second inquiry finds the debtor can pay (based on the $166
threshold), he may dismiss the debtor under this judicially administered Al-
ternative Minimum Means Test.
Judge Wedoff s interpretation thus rests on equating Chapter 13's can-
pay analysis with Section 707(b)'s should-pay algorithms. It is not clear,
however, that Congress intended to use these textually different provisions
interchangeably. Indeed, surely Congress did not care, other than in rare cases
such as a medical illness sufferer or a member of the military, whether the
debtor had expenses that were higher than those allowed under the IRS-
40. See, e.g., id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) ("[Tihe debtor's monthly expenses may
include an... allowance for food and clothing categories as specified by the National
Standards issued by the Internal Revenue Service.").
41. See, e.g., id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) ("[T]he debtor's monthly expenses may
include.., the continuation of actual expenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable
and necessary for care and support of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household
member.., who is unable to pay for such reasonable and necessary expenses.").
42. Cf id. § 101(10A) (excluding by statute certain sources of arguably available
income from creditor recovery).
43. Id. § 707(b)(2)(D) ("[T]he court may not dismiss or convert a case based on
any form of means testing, if the debtor is a disabled veteran.").
44. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion, supra note 1, at 1041.
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controlled means test.45 The question, therefore, is whether Congress cared if
a debtor had actual expenses that were lower.
There is reason to doubt that Congress did. The basis for this hesitance
is the possibility that it wanted the rehabilitated debtor to reap the "frugality
dividend" of having his actual expenses be lower than the means-test allowed
ones. Wedoff seems to accept too quickly that such a dividend should inure to
the benefit of the debtor's creditors. He would allow a dismissal motion under
Section 707(b)(3) to punish such a tight-belted debtor and enable her credi-
tors to reap that surplus. While it may be impossible to prove that the struc-
ture of the statute or the legislative history inexorably require that this excess
should go to the debtor,46 neither can Wedoff prove, without at least some
critical analysis, that it should go to the creditors. Indeed, given the absence
of express statutory command, if we want to theorize from first principles, we
can readily envision some ex ante policy reasons why Congress would be
disinclined to penalize frugal, means-test-passing debtors. Allowing a judge
the power to bar them from Chapter 7 would surely create perverse incentives
of moral hazard.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH CULHANE AND WHITE
Why not simply agree with Culhane and White? The problem with their
analysis is that it swings too far the other way and would hobble the wide
swath of discretion deliberately conferred on judges under Section
707(b)(3)(B). Their gloss of "serious misconduct" or "manifestly unreason-
able" - basically "bad faith lite" - is too narrow. It is also unsupported by
the language of the new Code.
Consider in this regard at least three possible ways a court could inter-
pret "the totality of the circumstances.., of the debtor's financial situation."
First, a court could say the "totality of the circumstances" means anything,
anywhere, remotely related to the debtor's finances. Second, a court could say
that the "totality of the circumstances" must be read in the context of a
means-test-dominated BAPCPA statute. As such, it is merely a safety valve
for a defective application of the means test and should only be applied to
remedy "cheating" or other misconduct problems that evince a debtor's com-
pliance with the letter but not spirit of the Code (similar to the way some
courts interpreted the "substantial abuse" standard pre-BAPCPA). 47 Third, a
45. One way of thinking about this is that Congress determined that unenumer-
ated expenses were unreasonable as a matter of law.
46. Consider, however, the debtor's ability to deduct IRS expenses, even if
greater than actual expenses. See supra note 40.
47. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States Trustee (In re Stewart), 215 B.R. 456, 467,
468 n.8 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) ("Bad faith, inaccurate representations to the Bank-
ruptcy Court, and eligibility for Chapter 13 are all factors to be considered under the
totality of the circumstances test .. "); see also In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th
Cir. 1989) (noting that, based on legislative history, Congress meant to deny Chapter
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court could say something in between, such as "totality of the circumstances"
means all relevant factors of a debtor's financial situation except those revisit-
ing the means test.
The reason to shy away from the first test is because it parses the phrase
"totality of the circumstances ... of the debtor's financial situation" in isola-
tion from the rest of the section and the statute as a whole. Under general
principles of statutory construction, when a statute "occupies a field" and
establishes a comprehensive scheme for determining one type of abuse
("should pay"), the inclusion of a caveat for finding other types of abuse
should not be allowed to bootstrap a revisitation of the same ground.48 Con-
sider again law school faculty policy. Suppose we say at the University of
Michigan Law School that any student with an average lower than C will be
expelled, and then we develop a complex formula for which courses to in-
clude in that average and how to weight them (perhaps, picking up on the
BAPCPA methodology, we say the six most recent courses). We then allow a
student to "rebut" that calculation by showing that the six most recent courses
were aberrational (e.g., she was away at another school with different grading
norms for her last six courses). Ever the risk-averse lawyers, we say that
nothing in our "C rule" precludes us from expelling a student for bad faith, or
for any other reason considering the totality of the circumstances of the stu-
dent's academic situation.
Could we kick out a student for embezzlement? Of course we could; that
would be bad faith. Could we kick out a student for plagiarizing? Yes, that
would be bad faith, too. It might also overlap with the totality of the circum-
stances of her academic situation (she thinks copying is an acceptable form of
learning). But two overlapping grounds of discretion should cause angst only
to the overly fastidious.49 The point is we could do it under the policy. Could
7 relief to "the dishonest or non-needy debtor" and pointing out that the court should
determine if the debtor is honest by looking at whether debtor has acted with "good
faith and candor in filing schedules and other documents").
48. This principle finds frequent outlet in the federal law "preemption" cases.
See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982) (reasoning that even in the absence of an express congressional command,
state law is nevertheless preempted if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative
field "as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it").
49. See Culhane & White, supra note 1, at 684 (explaining that the overlapping
grounds of Sections 707(b)(3)(A) and 707(b)(3)(B) stem from Congress's decision to
adopt two different tests from former 707(b) case law). Pre-BAPCPA, "filed in bad faith"
and "totality of the circumstances" were:
frequently and sometimes interchangeably used in cases under former section
707, before ability to pay was measured by the means test. Bad faith was used
both under section 707(a) as 'cause' for dismissal, as well as under former sub-
section 707(b) in substantial abuse cases, where it sometimes stood alone but
often was considered in addition to judicial tests of ability to pay.
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we expel a student for having bad study habits or for making persistently
inane comments in the classroom that evince a total misunderstanding of the
law? Probably so; both seem relevant to the totality of the circumstances of
her academic situation. But could we kick out a student for having a C+ aver-
age, on the theory that C+ is a pretty crummy grade point average in its own
right? Here is where we move to thin ice. To allow that would do violence to
the whole point of setting the mechanized formula in the first place for how to
count the C average and implement the C rule. Trying to boot a C+ student
who passes the C rule just sounds like a faculty member unhappy with where
that bar was set.50
But other than an anti-bootstrapping limitation to deal with the professor
who wants to expel the C+ student, any and all other circumstances of the
student's "academic situation" should be fair game for consideration. This is
the problem with the Culhane and White stance. Further qualifications, such
as "serious misconduct," appear to be cut out of whole cloth: possibly sensi-
ble refinements, to be sure, but not compelled by the faculty's deliberations.
Bringing the discussion back to bankruptcy law, this creates misgivings with
Culhane and White's proposed interpretation of Section 707(b)(3)(B). For
example, Culhane and White do not believe a debtor's portfolio of exempt
assets is a permissible ground to consider within the totality of the debtor's
financial situation, absent some misconduct like eve-of-bankruptcy trans-
fers.51 Why not? While some may say it is foolish policy to consider them,
and that it may even undermine the very purpose of having exemptions in the
first place (which is in part to protect a debtor's fresh start by ensuring a post-
bankruptcy baseline of available assets), others may disagree.52 In any event,
unwise policy on its own does not accord a sufficient basis to bar a bank-
ruptcy judge from noticing a debtor's enormous retirement plan account in
deciding whether it offends the spirit of the Code to let that debtor use Chap-
ter 7.53
50. The better and tougher question is would I allow kicking someone out who
makes semi-inane comments in class and has "only" a C+ average? Would consider-
ing the C+ average there, as part of the totality of the circumstances, be problematic?
That is a much closer call. I might foreclose this for prudential reasons alone for fear
of the dangerous pretextualism it could engender (or abet).
51. Culhane & White, supra note 1, at 690-691.
52. See, e.g., Stuart v. Koch (In re Koch), 109 F.3d 1285, 1290 (8th Cir. 1997).
53. For a former § 707(b) case holding that exempt assets are appropriately con-
sidered under the "totality of the circumstances," see Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re
Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A totality of circumstances inquiry is




V. TRYING TO FIND A MIDDLE GROUND
Trying to find a middle ground between the powerful arguments of
Judge Wedoff and Professors Culhane and White is not easy. Among other
challenges, it involves giving content to the amorphous "totality of the cir-
cumstances" standard in a principled, usable manner. This cannot be done by
simply relying on pre-BAPCPA case law interpreting former Section 707(b).
Recall that some courts then adopted a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach that considered multiple factors, including the debtor's income. 54 But
those tests sought to define the open-ended standard of "substantial abuse,"
with many including factors such as bad faith and misconduct.55 By contrast,
new Section 707(b)(3)(B) covers financial factors independent from bad faith,
which is already covered by Section 707(b)(3)(A), rendering much of former
Section 707(b)(3) precedent inapposite.
Nor is the task helped much by Congress's single cryptic clue in the text
of Section 707(b)(3)(B). Specifically, Congress says that a court must con-
sider whether "the totality of the circumstances (including whether the debtor
seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need for such
rejection as sought by the debtor) of the debtor's financial situation demon-
strates abuse. '56 Culhane and White explain how this was a compromise for
the recording industry that lobbied unsuccessfully to insert a blanket prohibi-
tion on rejecting certain personal service contracts by debtors in bankruptcy.
57
But how does one generalize from this parenthetical clause in the statute? Is it
an example? Is it a factor? On the one hand, there is the canon of ejusdem
58generis, which states that illustrations should be seen of the same genus of
the general. On the other hand, it could be argued that Congress was not pro-
viding an example, but rather was simply ensuring that one specific circum-
stance would not be forgotten by the judge. We also have history, where
some courts held that rejecting personal services contracts under former Sec-
54. See Stewart v. United States Trustee (In re Stewart), 215 B.R. 456 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 1997).
55. See id. (stating that bad faith is one of many factors to be considered under
the totality of the circumstances test).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B) (Supp. V 2005) (emphasis added).
57. Culhane & White, supra note 1, at 692 n.123 (citing In re Carrere, 64 B.R.
156, 157 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (dismissing case of actress who admitted she
wanted to reject contract with one TV network in order to sign one with another that
would pay her substantially more money).
58. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 129
(1991) ("Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a spe-
cific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the
one with specific enumeration.").
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tion 707 constituted bad faith.59 Perhaps Congress was simply endorsing this
case law and clarifying that a court may permissibly dismiss a debtor for re-
jecting a personal services contract.
Section 707(b)(3)(B) is thus a morass, and the struggle to tame it cannot
escape a fundamental difficulty. If the text had simply said "the totality of the
circumstances," it might have made sense to follow the Culhane and White
approach. The problem is that the text continues to say that the totality of the
circumstances must affect the debtor's 'financial situation," 6 which must in
turn be an instruction to weigh primarily financial matters, not primarily ethi-
cal or conduct-based matters. Thus, Culhane and White are likely moving in
the wrong direction by looking at conduct. Yet one equally encounters the
countervailing consideration, raised above, that Congress's comprehensive
treatment of permissible income under the means test renders unlikely the
probability that it wanted revisitation of the debtor's "grade" by an unhappy
judge under subsection (b)(3)(B). Accordingly, if we want to construct a
reading of (b)(3)(B) that does not render it superfluous, we need to come up
with financial factors of a debtor unrelated to his monthly income that might
warrant dismissal from Chapter 7.
This may seem to be a fine needle to thread, but perhaps it can be done
by focusing on assets rather than income. The means test addresses the
debtor's income in painful detail but is silent on her assets.6 1 To be sure, as-
sets, especially business assets, generally exist to generate income, but Sec-
tion 707(b) deals with consumer debtors with primarily consumer debts. And
surely a debtor's asset base, even her exempt assets, pertains to her "financial
situation." Thus I submit, although Culhane and White think it contrary to the
spirit of Congress, that not only is consideration of exempt assets permissible
under Section 707(b)(3)(B), but it is one of the few considerations that must
be permitted to make sense of this maddening provision. Indeed, using Sec-
tion 707(b)(3)(B) to examine the assets, exempt or otherwise, could also ad-
dress the concern some commentators have about the build-up of secured
debt to take advantage of the means-test deduction. 62 Plausibly a judge could
inquire whether a debtor with such a handsome portfolio of secured assets
requires relief under the Bankruptcy Code, when selling such assets might
alleviate financial distress.
63
59. In re Sammons, 210 B.R. 197 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that case
filed by debtor, at time when he was not in financial distress, solely for purpose of
rejecting agreement was filed in bad faith and could accordingly be dismissed).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
61. Culhane & White see this silence as insulating a debtor's assets from scru-
tiny. Culhane & White, supra note 1, at 690.
62. Id. at 688.
63. It certainly would improve cash flow. Of course, such an interpretation might
undermine the unlimited secured debt deduction under the means test. 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2005) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this clause,




Both Culhane and White and Wedoff agree that Section 707(b)(3)(B)
means Congress wanted judges to have some discretion to dismiss debtors for
reasons other than flunking the means test of (b)(2) and straight-out bad faith
under (b)(3)(A). Culhane and White contend that Congress did not intend this
caveat to be an end-run around the means test by a judge who would have
preferred the $166 allowable income threshold to have been set at a lower
level. Surely that is right. Similarly, it seems difficult to believe that Congress
would have wanted to divest the debtor of any frugality dividend resulting
from his actual net income being higher than his allowable net income under
the means test. The detail and structure of the means test suggest that Con-
gress intended it to be the exclusive manner of scrutinizing the debtor's per-
missible monthly income - what he "should pay" - under the Code.64 But
other than that income-based carveout, all other financial considerations
should be fair ground for an equitable decision to dismiss for the totality of
the circumstances under section 707(b)(3)(B). Judge Wedoff is thus correct to
part ways with Professors Culhane and White on that score.
My proposal to bridge the divide between these two positions is to focus
on a debtor's financial assets when considering a 707(b)(3)(B) motion. This
approach would give meaning to this provision of the Code in a way that
grants judges the discretion they need but does not tread on Congress's clear
occupation of the income scrutiny field. This reading might just make sense
of the "totality of the circumstances.. . of the debtor's financial condition" in
a post-means-test world.
64. Other than, for instance, income manipulation sufficient to rise to the level of
bad faith, such as (perhaps) suspending work irregularly to distort six-month trailing
income. Indeed, conceivably bad faith could deal with Judge Wedoff's hypothetical
CEO who is willing to sacrifice her professional reputation by filing personal bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 7. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion, supra note 1, at 1035-36.
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